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Finishing the Job on Section 356(a)(2):
Closing Loopholes and Providing Consistent
Treatment to Boot in Tax-Free Reorganizations
INTRODUCTION
The Obama administration has recently taken aim at a provision
in the tax code that allows shareholders to repatriate offshore
earnings from corporations without ever paying U.S. taxes on the
money earned. This loophole, called the “boot-within-gain
limitation,” is one of several problems in section 356(a)(2) of the
Internal Revenue Code.
This loophole works when a shareholder in the United States—
let’s say the shareholder is a corporation itself—owns two foreign
corporations with earnings that have not been taxed in the United
States. The shareholder causes the foreign corporations to merge in a
tax-free reorganization. The shareholder structures the transaction so
that the acquiring corporation gives its own stock and cash to the
shareholder in exchange for all of the shareholder’s stock in the target
corporation. The shareholder takes care to ensure that the cash and
stock received from the acquiring corporation do not exceed the value
of the target corporation’s stock. If the shareholder is successful,
section 356(a)(2) 1 allows the shareholder to receive the cash without
being taxed 2—but for this provision, the cash would have finally been
subject to U.S. federal income tax. 3 This loophole also applies when
the parties to the reorganization are domestic corporations.
Tax-free reorganizations allow corporations to merge or be acquired
by other corporations without being taxed on gain realized in the
transaction. To qualify for tax-free treatment, the transaction has to
meet specific requirements. The general requirement is that the
shareholders of the target corporation must receive stock in the
acquiring corporation as consideration in the transaction. The rationale
for not taxing these transactions is that the shareholders are not
1. Unless otherwise specified, all references in this Comment to a “section” refer to a
section within Title 26 of the United States Code.
2. 26 U.S.C. § 356(a)(2) (2012).
3. Subject to the section 902 foreign tax credit for domestic corporations. See Rev. Rul.
74-387, 1974-2 C.B. 207 (section 356(a)(2) boot dividends qualify for section 902).
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“cashing out” their interests in the corporation; instead they are
continuing their interest in another form. But section 356(a)(2) allows
shareholders to do just that—cash out their interest in the corporation.
Generally, if a shareholder receives cash in a reorganization, the
shareholder is taxed on the cash but can defer tax on the stock
received. 4 But when the cash has the effect of a dividend, section
356(a)(2) limits the amount of cash that is taxed to the overall gain
realized in the transaction. 5 In other words, if the total consideration
received in a qualifying reorganization provides a ten-dollar profit to
the shareholder, but the shareholder receives fifty dollars in cash,
only ten dollars of that cash is subject to tax. Thus, parties can
receive cash and avoid paying taxes by throwing some cash, which
would otherwise be taxed as a dividend, into a reorganization. But
when does cash have the effect of a dividend? Congress has not
provided an answer to this question.
This is not the only problem with section 356(a)(2); it contains
further opportunities for tax avoidance, it is inconsistent with the
rest of the Internal Revenue Code, and it is full of uncertainties that
have existed for ninety years without resolution.
Because of these shortcomings, section 356(a)(2) has been
attacked by Congress on-and-off over the last sixty years 6 and the
Obama administration has renewed its focus on this provision for
2016. 7 This Comment discusses the Obama administration’s
proposals for section 356(a)(2) and provides further
recommendations for those proposals. I argue that Congress should
specify when boot has the effect of a dividend and should supplant
the current Clark rule that has developed in the courts. The
replacement test should compare the shareholder’s interest in the
target corporation before the reorganization with the shareholder’s
interest in the acquiring corporation after the reorganization to
determine whether there has been a meaningful reduction in interest
under section 302(b).
4. See 26 U.S.C. § 356(a) (2012).
5. Id. § 356(a)(2).
6. See, e.g., Robert A. King, The Tax Treatment of Boot Distributions in Corporate
Reorganizations under § 356(a)(2)—Commissioner v. Clark, the Latest Word?, 11 WHITTIER
L. REV. 723, 724–31 (1990).
7. See Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2016
Revenue Proposals at 119–21 (Feb. 2015), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2016.pdf
[hereinafter
2016
Revenue Proposals].
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Part I of this Comment describes the policy, operation, and tax
consequences of tax-free reorganizations. Part II presents a detailed
analysis of section 356(a)(2) and its shortcomings. Lastly, Part III
explains the Obama proposals and a fairly recent proposal from the
House of Representatives and builds on these proposals to offer
solutions to the problems in section 356(a)(2).
I. TAX-FREE REORGANIZATION—GENERALLY
A transaction qualifies as a tax-free reorganization if it fits within
one of the seven categories described in section 368. This Part gives
a brief overview of tax-free reorganizations by first discussing the
policy behind tax-free reorganizations, second describing the
different categories of reorganizations, and then discussing the tax
consequences of a qualifying reorganization.
A. The Policy of Reorganizations
The Treasury regulations state that the purpose behind giving
tax-free treatment to transactions that qualify as reorganizations is
that the transactions are only “readjustments of corporate
structures . . . as [ ] required by business exigencies and which effect
only a readjustment of continuing interest in property under
modified corporate forms.” 8 In other words, the transaction is not an
actual “sale” of the corporation, but a “mere change in form.”
There are several policies behind not taxing these “changes in
form.” First, Congress wants to encourage efficient reorganizations
that are helpful to businesses and the economy. 9 Second, the gains in
a reorganization are only paper gains; the shareholders’ money is still
locked up in the corporation and shareholders might not be able to
pay the tax. 10 Third, there is no “basic change in relationships”
between the corporation and shareholders and there is “not a

8. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b)(as amended in 2011).
9. S. REP. NO. 66-398, at 17–19 (1924); see also 61 CONG. REC. 6563 (1921)
(statement of Sen. Watson) (“It is the exchange of the stock of different corporations for
business purposes; and at a time when so much reorganizations going on in the business
world, it is thought by all those interested in the upbuilding of the industries of the country at
this time that this is a very helpful provision.”).
10. S. REP. NO. 65-617, at 5-6 (1918) (“A provision was inserted designed to establish
the rule for determining taxable gains in the case of exchanges of property and to negative the
assertion of tax in the case of certain purely paper transactions.”); see also S. REP. NO. 68-398,
at 18 (1924).
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sufficient ‘cashing out’ of proprietary interests” to constitute an
actual realization event. 11
With the flexibility the Treasury Department, Congress, and the
courts have given to reorganizations over the years, some
commentators question whether these policies are still relevant or
whether reorganizations have “become a pure tax shelter shrouded
in an incredibly complex statutory scheme” that “is not grounded in
any overriding public policy.” 12 Nevertheless, the overarching policy
that reorganizations are “mere changes in form,” which are not, in
substance, realization events, continues to guide the requirements
for reorganizations.
B. Reorganization Transactions
There are seven categories of transactions that qualify as tax-free
reorganizations. Each category contains specific requirements that must
be met for the transaction to qualify.13 There are several generally
applicable requirements that apply to (almost) all of the categories.
1. Generally applicable requirements
Tax-free reorganizations have been part of the Internal Revenue
Code since 1918. 14 The judicial refinements that have developed
over the years are now incorporated into the Treasury Regulations.
The regulations set minimum requirements applicable for all seven
categories of reorganizations unless an explicit exception applies: 1)
continuity of shareholder interest; 2) continuity of business
11. King Enters., Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511, 515 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
12. Everett Skillman, The Non-Recognition of Taxable Gain in Corporate
Reorganizations—Reassessing Legislative Policy, 20 SW. U. L. REV. 369, 370 (1991); see also
King, supra note 6, at 755–56.
13. Note that the regulations state that each transaction must be evaluated under the
step-transaction doctrine. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(a). The step-transaction doctrine may cause a
transaction—standing by itself—to be treated as a mere step in an overall transaction, rather
than as an independent transaction, if the transaction is part of an overall transaction. Comm’r
v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 738 (1989) (“[I]nterrelated yet formally distinct steps in an integrated
transaction may not be considered independently of the overall transaction. By thus linking
together all interdependent steps with legal or business significance, rather than taking them in
isolation, federal tax liability may be based on a realistic view of the entire transaction.”). Thus,
an exchange qualifying as a tax-free reorganization by itself might not be given tax-free
treatment if it is part of a multistep transaction that would not qualify when viewed as a whole.
See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2008-25, 2008-1 C.B. 986.
14. Revenue Act of 1918, § 202(b), 40 Stat. 1057 (1918), reprinted in J. SEIDMAN,
SEIDMAN’S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS 1861-1938, at 898 (1938).
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enterprise; and 3) business purpose. 15 These are only minimum
requirements; a reorganization category itself may set out additional
or stricter requirements.
The first requirement, continuity of shareholder interest, is
central to the underlying policy of tax-free reorganizations; namely,
shareholders should not be taxed on the transaction because the
exchange is only a change in the form of the shareholder’s interest in
the business. 16 Essentially, it requires the acquiring corporation to
furnish its own stock as consideration to the selling shareholders. 17
The regulations suggest that the requirement will be satisfied if at
least forty percent of the consideration paid in the exchange is in
stock of the acquiring corporation. 18 After the reorganization, the
shareholders who received the acquiring corporation’s stock are free
to dispose of the stock at any time as long as it is not to a
corporation related 19 to the issuing corporation. 20
The second requirement, continuity of business enterprise, also
relates to the rationale that reorganizations are simply
15. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (as amended in 2011). As discussed above, these
minimum requirements, applicable to all categories of tax-free reorganizations, may be
superseded by the provisions relating to the categories themselves. As an example, continuity
of interest and continuity of business enterprise are not required in connection with
recapitalizations under section 368(a)(1)(E).
16. See supra Part II.A; see also H.R. REP. NO. 73-704, at 13 (1934), reprinted in 19391 C.B. (Part 2) 554, 564; BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 500 (2d ed. 1966); PAUL R. MCDANIEL,
ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS 539 (3d ed. 2006).
17. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(1)(i). For an expansive treatment on the origin and
development of the continuity of interest requirement, see David. F. Shores, Reexamining
Continuity of Shareholder Interest in Corporate Reorganizations, 17 VA. TAX REV. 419, 427
(1998) (“The new regulations shift the focus from whether Seller intended to retain a
proprietary interest in the reorganized enterprise, to whether a proprietary interest was
furnished by . . . the acquiring corporation.”). Note that if the reorganization is structured as a
triangular merger, the parent corporation of the acquiring corporation is required to furnish its
stock as consideration in the exchange. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b).
18. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(2)(v), ex. 1 (stating that continuity of interest requirement
is met when shareholder receives $60 in cash and $40 in stock of the acquiring corporation);
see also John A. Nelson Corp. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 374 (1935) (holding that shareholder
receipt of consideration consisting of 38% of acquiring corporation equity qualified as a taxfree reorganization treatment).
19. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(4) (as amended in 2011). The focus is on corporate
shareholders. Thus, a sale to a human shareholder who owns shares of the acquiring
corporation will not violate this rule. T.D. 8760, 63 Fed. Reg. 4174, 4176 (Jan. 28, 1998).
20. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(1)(i) (“[A] mere disposition of stock of the issuing
corporation received in a potential reorganization to persons not related . . . to the issuing
corporation is disregarded.”); see also id. § 1.368-1(e)(8), ex. 3.
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“readjustments of continuing interests in property under modified
corporate form.” 21 This requirement is met if the acquiring
corporation either 1) continues one line of the target corporation’s
historic business, or 2) uses a significant portion of the target
corporation’s assets in a business. 22 This requirement is relatively easy
to meet. 23 The business purpose requirement simply requires that the
transaction “have a business purpose apart from tax avoidance; that
is, it must be undertaken for reasons germane to the continuance of
the business of a corporation.” 24 Under this requirement, taxpayers
are not disqualified when minimizing taxes is simply a motive of the
transaction. But taxpayers are disqualified if the transaction is entered
into with the main purpose of avoiding taxes. 25 The business purpose
requirement, developed through case law, 26 is not explicitly stated in
the regulations; however, this requirement is widely considered 27 to
be implied in several places throughout the regulations. 28
21. Id. § 1.368-1(d)(1).
22. Id. § 1.368-1(d)(1), (2).
23. For example, if the target corporation had several lines of business, the acquiring
corporation is only required to continue one of the significant lines of business. Id. § 1.3681(d)(2)(ii), (d)(5), ex. 1. Or if a manufacturing corporation acquires a corporation that makes
components used in the manufacturing corporation’s product and the acquiring corporation only
keeps the assets of the target corporation as a backup in case other components from other
suppliers are in short supply, the continuity of interest requirement will be satisfied. Id. at ex. 2.
24. Joseph R. Gomez, Tax Aspects of Mergers and Acquisitions for the Corporate Lawyer,
5 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 321, 340–41 (2001).
25. To illustrate: in an early case, a sole-shareholder attempted to transfer appreciated
property from the corporation to herself through a tax-free reorganization which would
transfer the property to a new corporation that would then be liquidated. Gregory v.
Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). Out of this case came the famous quote by Judge Learned
Hand that “[a]ny one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; . . .
there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one’s taxes.” Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809,
810 (2d Cir. 1934), aff’d, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). But the Court held that, in this case, the
transaction had no business purpose and was done solely for tax avoidance reasons. Gregory,
293 U.S. at 469.
26. See, e.g., Gregory, 293 U.S. 465.
27. See, e.g., GOMEZ, supra note 24; David F. Shores, Continuity of Business Enterprise:
A Concept Whose Time Has Passed, 63 TAX L. 471, 496 (2010); Arturo Requenez II & Joshua
D. Odintz, New Flexibility Under Final Regs. Affecting Foreign-Law Mergers and Section 367,
105 J. TAX’N, 151 (Sept. 2006).
28. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(b)(2)(as amended in 2010) parenthetically states that
“business purpose” is one of the general requirements of a reorganization. For other provisions
where the business purpose requirement is implied, see Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (“The
purpose of the reorganization provisions of the Code is to except from the general rule certain
specifically described exchanges incident to such readjustments of corporate structures . . . as
are required by business exigencies . . . . Both the terms of the specifications and their
underlying assumptions and purposes must be satisfied in order to entitle the taxpayer to the
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2. Categories of reorganization
The seven categories of reorganizations in § 368(a)(1)(A)–(G)
have unique and specific requirements. The categories are often
referred to in shorthand by reference to the appropriate
subparagraph—for example, a reorganization structured pursuant to
§ 368(a)(1)(A) is referred to as a “Type A” reorganization.
Type A, B, and C reorganizations are the “acquisitive”
reorganizations. These transactions involve one corporation
acquiring another corporation. Type A reorganizations are
“statutory mergers.” 29 These are mergers affected pursuant to
state corporate law. After a Type A reorganization is complete, the
acquiring corporation will own all assets and liabilities of the
target corporation, and the target corporation will cease to
exist. 30Type A reorganizations are frequently used in triangular
reorganizations where the target corporation merges into a
subsidiary of the acquiring corporation. 31 As a result, the
acquiring corporation is able to shield itself from any liabilities
assumed from the target corporation while taking advantage of
the flexibility of Type A reorganizations. 32
Type B reorganizations are “stock for stock acquisitions” where
the selling shareholders exchange their stock for stock of the
benefit of the exception from the general rule.”); and Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(g) (“[T]he
readjustments involved in the exchanges . . . must be undertaken for reasons germane to the
continuance of the business . . . .”).
29. 26 U.S.C. § 368(a)(1)(A) (2012).
30. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(b)(1)(ii); see also Rev. Rul. 2000-5, 2000-1 C.B. 436. There
are no further specific requirements for Type A reorganizations; however, Type A
reorganizations are subject to the generally applicable requirements discussed above. Thus,
shareholders of the target corporation may receive as much as 60% of the consideration in the
form of boot and as little as 40% of the consideration in the form of acquiring corporation
stock. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(2)(v), ex. 1; see also supra Part I.B.1.
31. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(b)(1)(iii), ex. 4. This type of reorganization is authorized
by § 368(a)(2)(D). Certain additional requirements apply to such a transaction; namely,
substantially all of the target corporation’s assets must be acquired, and no stock of the
subsidiary corporation may be used in the transaction. Thus, the stock must come from the
parent corporation. Id. The “substantially all” requirement is the same as the “substantially all”
requirement for Type C reorganizations discussed below. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(b)(2); see
infra note 37.
32. Note that triangular mergers may be structured in varying forms and under other
reorganization types, such as Type B or C reorganizations. See 26 U.S.C. § 368(a)(2)(C)–(D)
(2012). For an in-depth discussion of triangular tax-free reorganizations, see Stephanie Hoffer
& Dale A. Oesterle, Tax-Free Reorganizations: The Evolution and Revolution of Triangular
Mergers, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1083 (2014).
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purchasing corporation. 33 Type B reorganizations are less flexible
than Type A reorganizations, and no boot may be given in a Type B
reorganization. 34 In other words, there is no boot in a B. 35 Type C
reorganizations are asset acquisitions where the acquiring
corporation purchases the assets of the target corporation. 36 The
target corporation is then required to distribute the consideration to
its shareholders unless the IRS gives special permission. 37
Type D reorganizations can be structured as either acquisitive
reorganizations or divisive reorganizations. In Type D acquisitive
reorganizations, a corporation transfers its assets to another
corporation, and either the transferring corporation or some of its
shareholders must be in control of the acquiring corporation after
the transfer. 38 Type D acquisitive reorganizations provide substantial
33. 26 U.S.C. § 368(a)(1)(B) (2012).
34. Additionally, the acquiring corporation must have control over the target
corporation immediately after the exchange. 26 U.S.C. § 368(a)(1)(B) (2012). The acquiring
corporation has control, for purposes of § 368, when it acquires at least 80% of the combined
voting power of stock and 80% of all other classes of stock. Id. § 368(c).
35. Id. § 368(a)(1)(B). This requirement is subject to a minor exception allowing cash
to be paid in lieu of a fractional share. Rev. Rul. 66-365, 1966-2 C.B. 116, 117. There is an
additional exception to this rule (although the IRS considers it as a separate exchange rather
than an exception) that allows a debt-for-debt exchange in connection with a Type B
reorganization. Rev. Rul. 98-10, 1998-1 C.B. 643.
36. 26 U.S.C. § 368(a)(1)(C)(2012). The acquiring corporation must purchase
“substantially all of the properties” of the selling corporation. Id. This involves a factual
analysis of the quantity and quality of the property transferred. See Robert A. Rizzi, Corporate
Organizations and Reorganizations: Quantity and Quality in the Substantially All
Requirement, 20 J. CORP. TAX’N 171 (1993). As a safe harbor, this requirement is met if the
acquiring corporation receives 90% of the target corporation’s net assets and 70% of the target
corporation’s gross assets. Rev. Proc. 77-37, § 3.01, 1977-2 C.B. 568. Additionally, at least
80% of the consideration paid to the target corporation must be the acquiring corporation’s
voting stock. 26 U.S.C. § 368(a)(2)(B)(iii) (2012). This requirement is more complicated
when the acquiring corporation purchases less than 100% of the target corporation’s assets.
The statute requires that at least 80% of the corporation’s total assets be paid for in voting
stock. Thus, if the target corporation only sells 90% of its assets, the acquiring corporation
must still exchange voting stock equal to the value of at least 80% of the corporation’s total
assets, limiting the amount of remaining consideration that may be boot. There are also special
rules when the acquiring corporation assumes the liabilities of the target corporation. If the
acquiring corporation does not use boot, the assumption of liabilities is not treated as boot. Id.
§ 368(a)(1)(C). But if the acquiring corporation uses boot, the assumption of liabilities will be
treated as boot and will count against the 20% boot allowance. Id. § 368(a)(2)(B)(iii).
37. 26 U.S.C. § 368(a)(2)(G) (2012).
38. Id. § 368(a)(1)(D). The “continuity of interest” requirement is specifically excused
for Type D acquisitive reorganizations; however, the continuity of interest requirement is
inherent in the requirement that the transferee corporation or shareholders control the
acquiring corporation. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b)(as amended in 2011).
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flexibility in structuring the transaction. 39 A Type D “divisive”
reorganization occurs when one corporation is divided into two or
more corporations by transferring part of its assets to another
corporation and distributing the shares of the other corporation to
its shareholders. 40
The remaining categories of reorganizations relate to internal
corporate
restructuring.
Type
E
reorganizations
are
recapitalizations; 41 Type F reorganizations are changes in identity,
form, or place of organization; 42 and Type G reorganizations involve
transfers in connection with a bankruptcy plan. 43
C. Tax Consequences
Under the tax code, a sale or exchange of property results in a
“realization” event where either gain or loss is realized. 44 Unless
there is a specific exception in the code, realized gains or losses from
sales of property must be “recognized” and included in gross
income. 45 Section 354(a)(1) provides such an exception for
shareholders (whether corporate or human) who, pursuant to a plan
of reorganization, exchange securities in a corporation that is a party
to a reorganization for securities in another corporation that is a
party to the reorganization.46The corporations that are themselves
the subjects of the reorganization will not recognize any gain on the
corporate level if the transaction is structured properly. 47

39. See Jasper L. Cummings Jr., The Stockless D Reorganization Regulations, 112 J.
TAX’N 96 (Feb. 2010); Thomas W. Avent Jr., Transfers of Assets to Controlled Corporations: The
All Cash D Reorganization, 32 CORP. TAX’N 3 (May/June 2005). Recent regulations state
that the consideration may be 100% cash if the same shareholders own all the shares of the
transferring corporation and the acquiring corporation in identical proportions. Treas. Reg. §
1.368-2(l)(2) (if the same shareholders own all of the shares of the transferring corporation
and the acquiring corporation in identical proportions, the consideration may be purely in the
form of cash and still qualify as a tax-free reorganization).
40. 26 U.S.C. § 368(a)(1)(D) (2012). This type of reorganization must meet additional
requirements found in section 355.
41. Id. § 368(a)(1)(E). A recapitalization may occur, for example, when a shareholder
exchanges his interest for a different kind of equity interest. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(e)(as
amended in 2010).
42. 26 U.S.C. § 368(a)(1)(F) (2012).
43. Id. § 368(a)(1)(G).
44. Id. § 1001 (2012).
45. Id. §§ 1001(c); 61(a)(3), 1(a), 11(a).
46. Id. § 354(a)(1) (2012).
47. Id. § 361(a) (2012).
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The tax consequences to shareholders are the focus of the 2016
revenue proposals and this Comment. Limitations exist on the
nonrecognition rule provided for shareholders under section 354
that are not important for purposes of this comment. 48 But one
important limitation under section 354(a)(1) is that the only
property that can be exchanged is “stock or securities.” 49 This
apparently strict limitation is loosened by section 356(a), which
provides that if something other than stock or securities is exchanged
in an exchange that would otherwise qualify under section 354, then
the shareholder will be taxed on the additional property received and
nonrecognition treatment will still be available for the stock or
securities. 50 This “other property received” is referred to as “boot.”
Boot may consist of any type of property, including cash.
The tax that would have been recognized by the shareholder, if
not for the reorganization provisions, does not disappear, it is merely
deferred. The shareholders take a basis in the property received taxfree (i.e., the stock or securities) equal to the basis the shareholders
had in the property they surrendered. 51 The basis of the securities
surrendered will typically be the original amount the shareholder
paid for them. 52 If the shareholder later sells the securities received in
the reorganization, the shareholder will be taxed on the amount for
which the shareholder sold the securities less the shareholder’s basis
in the securities 53—this is called “gain.” Thus, shareholders will
eventually be taxed on the securities received in a reorganization
when the shareholders ultimately dispose of the securities. 54
II. BOOT THAT HAS THE EFFECT OF A DIVIDEND
Section 356(a) provides relief to the strict requirement of section
354 that consideration be in the form of stock or securities:
48. For example, under § 354(a)(2), nonrecognition is only allowed to the point that
the securities exchanged are equal in value and any excess will be taxable. Other limitations are
found in § 354 but are not important for purposes of this Comment.
49. 26 U.S.C. § 354(a)(1) (2012).
50. Id. § 356(a).
51. Id. § 358(a). Special tracing provisions apply when a reorganization involves boot.
Treas. Reg. § 1.356-1(b) (as amended in 2011). Typically the reorganization agreement
should identify which shares are received in exchange for boot. Id. If the agreement fails to
specify, then the boot will be applied against each security pro rata. Id.
52. 26 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (2012).
53. Id. § 1001(a) (emphasis added).
54. Assuming the securities are not held until death so that 26 U.S.C. § 1014 applies.
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(1) Recognition of gain
If—(A) section 354 or 355 would apply to an exchange but for the
fact that (B) the property received in the exchange consists not only
of property permitted by section 354 . . . but also of other property or
money, then the gain, if any, to the recipient shall be recognized, but
in an amount not in excess of the sum of such money and the fair
market value of such other property. 55

In other words, the shareholder will recognize any boot received
in the transaction; however, the amount recognized is limited by the
gain on the overall transaction. For example, if a shareholder
exchanges stock with a basis of $100 for stock with a fair market
value of $80 and $40 in cash in a qualifying reorganization, then the
shareholder will only recognize $20 of the cash received because the
total gain on the transaction was $20. This is known as the bootwithin-gain limitation.
Historically, boot received in reorganizations was taxed at capital
gains rates. 56 Congress became concerned that taxpayers were using
boot payments in reorganizations to bailout corporate earnings and
profits at capital gains rates. 57 In response to this concern, Congress
added what is now section 356(a)(2) to the Internal Revenue Code
in 1924:
Treatment as dividend
If an exchange is described in paragraph (1) but has the effect of the
distribution of a dividend . . . , then there shall be treated as a
dividend to each distributee such an amount of the gain recognized
under paragraph (1) as is not in excess of his ratable share of the
undistributed earnings and profits of the corporation accumulated
after February 28, 1913. The remainder, if any, of the gain
recognized under paragraph (1) shall be treated as gain from the
exchange of property. 58

This provision has remained largely unchanged since 1924 59 and
has been subject to extensive criticism. 60

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

26 U.S.C. § 356(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
See King, supra note 6, at 725–26; cf. 26 U.S.C. § 356(a)(2) (2012).
H.R. REP. NO. 68-179, at 14–15, (1924); S. REP. NO. 68-398, at 15–16 (1924).
26 U.S.C. § 356(a)(2) (2012) (emphasis added).
Id.; cf. Internal Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 203(d)(2), 43 Stat. 253, 257.
See infra Part III.
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The treatment of a “dividend” under section 356(a)(2)
substantially differs from section 301’s treatment of a dividend. First,
it is limited by the “boot-within-gain limitation” described above. 61
Second, the dividend is limited to the shareholder’s “ratable share”
of earnings and profits. 62 Third, the dividend is only subject to the
accumulated earnings and profits, as opposed to the current earnings
first and then the accumulated earnings. 63
Section 356(a)(2) also leaves several things uncertain. The
statute does not say whether to look to the target corporation’s or
the acquiring corporation’s earnings and profits. And, importantly,
the statute, as well as the legislative history, is silent on the issue of
when boot has the effect of a dividend. 64 Each of these issues is
discussed in turn below after a general explanation of the taxation of
dividends and purpose of section 356(a)(2).
A. Dividend Taxation and the Purpose of Section 356(a)(2)
Shareholders may receive money for their ownership interest in a
corporation in various ways. First, a shareholder may simply sell his
shares in the corporation to another party in an arms-length
transaction. The shareholder will be able to offset the amount
received against his basis and the gain on the sale will be taxed as
capital gain. 65 Characterization of gain as capital gain is advantageous
because capital gains are taxed at a lower rate than ordinary
income. 66
Alternatively, shareholders may receive money for their interest in
a corporation through a redemption, where a corporation buys back
its own stock from a shareholder. 67 The money the shareholder
receives from the corporation may be characterized as either a sale
61. 26 U.S.C. § 356(a)(2) (2012). In contrast, dividends under section 301 are taxed
on their entire amount. Id. §§ 301(a), (c), 316(a).
62. Id. § 356(a)(2). Earnings and profits are discussed in Section II.A. Contrast this
provision with section 316(a), which subjects shareholders to the corporation’s entire earnings
and profits. Id.§ 316(a).
63. Id. § 356(a)(2). Compare with § 316(a), which states that a dividend is any
distribution made from current earnings and profits first and then accumulated earnings and
profits.Id.§ 316(a).
64. See King, supra note 6, at 727.
65. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 1221, 1222 (2012).
66. For example, in 2014, taxpayers whose taxable income falls in the 39.6% tax bracket
are only taxed at 20% on their capital gains. Id. 1(h)(1)(D).
67. Id. § 317(b).
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(subject to a basis offset and capital gains treatment), or as a
dividend. 68 Section 302(b) gives several tests to determine if the
money received should be treated as a sale. The overarching purpose
of the tests is to give sale treatment to redemptions that “result in a
meaningful reduction of the shareholder’s proportionate interest in
the corporation.” 69 Section 302(b)(2) is a safe harbor for the
meaningful reduction test. Section 302(b)(2) states that a
meaningful reduction occurs when (1) “after the redemption the
shareholder owns less than 50 percent of the total combined voting
power of all classes of [voting] stock,” and (2) the percentage of
voting and common stock “owned by the shareholder immediately
after the redemption . . . is less than 80% of [the interest the
shareholder had before the redemption]”—in other words, the
shareholder’s interest must decrease by more than 20%. 70 Section
302(b)’s meaningful reduction test is used in section 356(a)(2) to
determine whether boot is taxed as a capital gain or if boot has the
effect of a dividend.
Shareholders may also receive money for their ownership interest
through dividends from the corporation. A dividend is defined in
section 316(a) as a distribution from a corporation out of its current
and accumulated earnings and profits (“earnings”). 71 Therefore,
money paid from a corporation to its shareholders is only a dividend
to the extent of the corporation’s earnings. For the sake of simplicity,
earnings and profits can loosely be defined as profits (after expenses)
that the corporation does not pay out to its shareholders. 72First, the
earnings of the current tax year are examined to determine if the
amount is a dividend, and then the accumulated earnings of prior
years are examined. 73 Thus, if a corporation made a profit in the year
it paid money to its shareholders, but operated at a loss every prior
year, the prior year losses would not offset the current year earnings
68. Id. § 302(a), (d).
69. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 313 (1970).
70. 26 U.S.C. § 302(b)(2)(B), (C). Under section (C), shares of family members and
related parties may be attributed to the shareholder. Id. § 302(b)(2)(C).
71. Id. § 316(a)(2012).
72. A more circumscribed, but still rough, definition of earnings and profits is taxable
income plus excluded receipts (such as tax exempt income, e.g., interest from municipal
bonds) minus nondeductible disbursements (e.g. federal tax payments). See 26 U.S.C. §
312(a) (2012); JEFFREY L. KWALL, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS,
PARTNERSHIPS, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, AND THEIR OWNERS 202 (4th ed. 2012).
73. Treas. Reg. § 1.316-2(a).
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for purposes of determining whether the distribution was a dividend.
If the corporation pays out any money in excess of its current year
and accumulated earnings, that excess will first be offset by the
shareholder’s basis (and thus not be taxed). 74 If there is cash left over
after being offset by the shareholder’s basis, the excess is taxed as
capital gain. 75
If the corporation has sufficient earnings, then the entire amount
of the distribution is included in the shareholder’s gross income, and
the shareholder’s basis in stock of the corporation will not offset any
of the amount taxed. Historically, dividends were taxed at higher
rates than ordinary income. 76 Due to these tax consequences,
shareholders may have a preference for receiving funds from the
corporation that are characterized as capital gains. 77 This may drive a
transaction to be structured so that taxpayers can bailout corporate
earnings at capital-gains rates. 78 It was precisely this reason that
prompted the creation of section 356(a)(2).
Section 356(a)(2) was promulgated to prevent abuse where boot
paid in a reorganization is, in reality, a disguised dividend. The
legislative history of section 356(a)(2) provides an illustration of the
potential for abuse:
Corporation A has capital stock of $100,000, and earnings and
profits . . . of $50,000. If it distributes the $50,000 as dividend to
its stockholders, the amount distributed will be taxed at the full
surtax rates.
On the other hand, Corporation A may organize Corporation B, to
which it transfers all its assets, the consideration for the transfer
being the issuance by B of all its stock and $50,000 in cash to the
74. 26 U.S.C. § 301(c)(2) (2012).
75. Id. § 301(c)(3).
76. Currently, the stakes aren’t quite as high because dividends are taxed at the same
rates as capital gains. Id. § 1(h)(11).. But this has only been the case since 2003. See Jobs and
Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752, 760–64
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. 752). Moreover, even though the tax
rates are the same, dividends are not capital gains—thus, shareholders cannot offset dividends
with basis.
77. 26 U.S.C. §§ 301(c)(1), 61(a)(7) (2012). A shareholder that is a corporation might
prefer dividends to take advantage of the dividends-received deduction of section 243. See Rev.
Rul. 72-327, 1972-2 C.B. 197 (dividend-boot from section 356(a)(2) qualifies for section
243 deduction).
78. See, e.g., Daniel M. Schneider, Internal Revenue Code § 355 Before and After the Tax
Reform Act of 1986: A Study in the Regulation of Corporate Tax Bailouts, 39 OKLA. L. REV.
567, 567–77 (1986).
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stockholders of Corporation A in exchange for their stock in
Corporation A. Under the existing law, the $50,000 distributed
with the stock of Corporation B would be taxed, not as a dividend,
but as a capital gain, subject [to more favorable rates]. The effect of
such a distribution is obviously the same as if the corporation had
declared out as a dividend its $50,000 earnings and profits. If
dividends are to be subject to the full surtax rates, then such an
amount so distributed should also be subject to the surtax rates and
not to the [favorable] rate on capital gain. 79

To prevent “bailouts” of earnings at capital gains rates, section
356(a)(2) states that if boot has the effect of a dividend, it shall be
treated as a dividend. 80 But section 356(a)(2) contains several
provisions that have resulted in uncertainty, inconsistency in the
code, and increased complexity.
B. The Boot-Within-Gain Limitation
Section 356(a)(2) incorporates section 356(a)(1)’s boot-withingain limitation. Therefore, the boot treated as a dividend will only be
recognized to the extent of gain on the overall transaction. 81 The
boot-within-gain limitation is the most criticized way that section
356(a)(2)’s treatment of dividends is inconsistent with the rest of the
Internal Revenue Code. 82
The boot-within-gain limitation has recently received attention
in the context of cross-border reorganizations. Consider the
following example:
a) Parent, a United States corporation, owns FS1 and FS2,
foreign subsidiary corporations;
b) Both FS1 and FS2 have substantial earnings that have not
been taxed by the United States government;
c) FS2’s stock is worth $100; Parent’s basis in FS2 stock
is $100;

79. H.R. REP. NO. 68-179, at 15 (1923).
80. 26 U.S.C. § 356(a)(2)(2012).
81. See supra note 58 and the accompanying text.
82. See infra Part III.
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d) FS1 purchases FS2’s stock from Parent for $90 cash and
$10 worth of FS1 stock in a qualifying Type-D
reorganization. 83
In this transaction, Parent did not realize any gain. 84 Thus, under
section 356(a)(2), Parent would not be taxed on the $90 of cash
received. Since FS1 had earnings that were never taxed by the
United States at the corporate level, Parent received $90 cash
without paying any domestic taxes on it. 85
The problem with the boot-within-gain limitation in section
356(a)(2) is not limited to repatriation of earnings. Domestic
corporations can use a reorganization to bailout earnings without
paying the second-level shareholder tax. 86 As a general policy matter,
section 356(a)(1)’s boot-within-gain limitation rule makes sense
because, if the boot is characterized as a sale, a sale would not be
taxed if there was no gain on the sale. But when the boot is
characterized as a dividend, the justification for this limitation falls
apart because dividends are typically included in ordinary income
and taxed in their entirety.
The boot-within-gain limitation is internally inconsistent with
the Internal Revenue Code. Compare the limitation to section 301
where dividends are taxed in their entirety. 87 In section 302, if a
redemption does not meet one of the 302(b) tests for sale treatment,
it is treated as a distribution under section 301 and taxed in its
entirety. In section 304, if a shareholder has a controlling interest in
83. This example is based on an example in Joseph M. Calianno & Brad Rode,
Navigating the IRS’s Attack on Perceived Repatriation Transactions, 39 TAX MGMT. INT’L J.
197, 205 (2010).
84. Additionally, the acquiring subsidiary could make a check-the-box election to
change the target subsidiary’s classification from a corporation to a disregarded entity. See
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(c) (1996). The target subsidiary would be deemed as distributing all
of its assets to the acquiring subsidiary in liquidation, and the parent corporation would
remove one layer of control between itself and the target corporation.
85. For further discussion on the use of section 356 to repatriate earnings from foreign
subsidiaries, see Calianno & Rode, supra note 83, at 204.
86. Some commentators have even suggested that boot limited by section 356(a)(2)’s
boot-within-gain limitation might cause the earnings of the target corporation to be reduced
under section 312, even though the boot was not taxed. Id. at n.46 (“Since § 312 contains no
specific rules about the effect of a boot-distribution on E&P, the general rules of § 312 seem to
require a reduction in E&P by the amount of distribution without regard to the amount actually
taxable to the recipient shareholders.”) (quoting George C. Koutouras et al., “Boot Distributions
and Assumption of Liabilities,” 782-3d Tax Mgmt. (BNA) U.S. Income, at IV-C-8).
87. This assumes that there are sufficient earnings in the corporation so that section
301(c)(1) applies.
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two corporations and corporation one buys the shareholder’s stock
in corporation two, the shareholder’s interest in corporation two is
subject to the section 302(b) test. If the shareholder fails, the entire
amount received is taxed as a distribution under section 301. There
is no clear policy reason for treating section 356(a)(2) dividends
differently than these other sections. 88 As a matter of internal
consistency, the boot-within-gain limitation of section 356(a)(2)
needlessly complicates the tax code.
In a practical sense, the boot-within-gain limitation of section
356(a)(2) may only benefit shareholders seeking to avoid tax by
bailing out corporate earnings. Some commentators suggest that
section 356(a)(2)’s boot-within-gain limitation can only be
explained as a drafting error. 89 Because of the “incoherent” nature of
this rule, 90 Congress has been calling for its repeal off and on since
1954. 91 All attempts, both historical and recent, to eliminate the
boot-within-gain limitation have failed. 92
C. Ratable Share of Earnings
If boot has the effect of a dividend, section 356(a)(2) limits the
boot that is treated as a dividend to the shareholder’s ratable share of
the earnings of the corporation. To illustrate, suppose that target
corporation has $100 of earnings, shareholder owns 25% of target
corporation, shareholder has zero basis in his stock, and shareholder
receives $50 cash that has the effect of a dividend and $50 of stock
in a reorganization. The shareholder will have $100 of gain and the
$50 of cash will not be limited by the boot-within-gain limitation.
But the shareholder’s ratable share of the corporation’s earnings is

88. Even past defenders of this rule were unable to answer why dividends should receive
different treatment if received pursuant to a reorganization than if received from a traditional
corporate distribution. See, e.g., Advisory Group Recommendations of Subchapters C, J, and K of
the Internal Revenue Code: Hearing on H.R. 4459 Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means,
86th Cong. Congress, 745–800 (1959) (showing that at a Congressional hearing supporters
of the boot-within-gain limitation testified that it was unfair to tax a shareholder on boot if the
exchange resulted in loss to the shareholder, but were unable to explain why boot treated as a
dividend in a reorganization should be treated differently than an ordinary dividend).
89. See Bruce D. Shoulson, Boot Taxation: The Blunt Toe of the Automatic Rule, 20 TAX.
L. REV. 573, 578–79 (1965).
90. S. REP. NO. 98-95, at 94 (1983) (Conf. Rep.).
91. King, supra note 6, at 728–31.
92. See infra text accompanying notes 8–1549.
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only $25; therefore, only $25 of the boot received will be taxed as a
dividend while the rest will be taxed as capital gain.
The ratable share rule is another way shareholders can bailout
corporate earnings. There are many opportunities for shareholders in
closely held corporations to structure a transaction to bailout
earnings, especially since the attribution rules do not apply. 93 For
example, Husband owns 75% of Mom & Pop Corporation and Wife
owns 25%. Mom & Pop has $100 of earnings, and Husband and
Wife both have zero basis in their shares. Mom & Pop is acquired in
a qualifying reorganization for $200 of Acquiring Corporation stock
and $100 cash, and Husband and Wife receive a proportionate share
of stock and boot. Assume the exchange has the effect of a dividend.
Husband would receive $75 cash and $150 of Acquiring stock and
Wife would receive $25 cash and $50 of Acquiring stock. All $100
of boot received would be taxed as a dividend.
But Husband and Wife can structure the transaction above so
that Wife receives all of the boot and $50 of Acquiring stock and
Husband receives the rest of the stock. Only $25 of the boot will be
taxed as a dividend because Wife’s ratable share of the corporation’s
earnings is only $25. If section 356(a)(2) treated dividends
consistently with the rest of the tax code, all $75 that Wife received
would be taxed because all of the corporation’s earnings would
apply. This example demonstrates how the ratable share rule can lead
to abuse in closely held corporations.
The ratable share rule also creates internal inconsistencies in the
code. In sections 301(c) and 316, distributions to a shareholder are
determined with reference to all of the corporation’s earnings. 94
When applicable, the corporation’s entire earnings are also used in
redemptions under section 302 and sales to a related corporation
under section 304. There is no convincing policy reason to give

93. 318(a) provides that an individual or entity may be deemed as owning the stock
owned by other family members and entities. 26 U.S.C. § 318(a) (2012). Section 318(a) only
applies when “the rules contained in this section are expressly made applicable.” Id. In section
356(a)(2), attribution is only applied when determining whether boot has the effect of a
dividend, not in determining the shareholder’s ratable share of earnings. Id. § 356(a).
94. 26 U.S.C. § 316(a) (2012) (“Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, every
distribution is made out of earnings and profits to the extent thereof, and from the most
recently accumulated earnings and profits.”).
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different treatment to shareholders receiving boot deemed as a
dividend under section 356. 95
D. Accumulated Earnings
Section 356(a)(2) states that boot that has the effect of a
dividend will be taxed to the extent of the shareholder’s ratable share
of the corporation’s earnings “accumulated.” 96 This provision could
mean one of two things. At worst, it could mean that only the
accumulated earnings, and not the current year earnings, are
considered. At best, this provision means that the accumulated
earnings may offset the corporation’s current earnings. Both
interpretations are unsatisfactory.
For sections 301, 302, and 304, the regulations in section 316
provide that, in determining whether a distribution is made out of
the corporation’s earnings, the earnings of the current tax year
should be examined first. 97 Then, if the distribution exceeds the
current year earnings, the accumulated earnings should be used to
determine whether the excess is a dividend. 98 So, when a corporation
makes a profit in the year it distributes money to its shareholders,
but operates at a loss every prior year, the prior year losses will not
offset the current year earnings for purposes of determining whether
the distribution is a dividend.
Because section 316 distinguishes between accumulated earnings
and current year earnings, section 356(a)(2) may be interpreted to
mean that boot is only a dividend to the extent of accumulated
earnings without counting current year earnings. 99 This
interpretation is likely wrong.
95. In 1959, in a hearing before the Ways and Means committee, the stated purpose of
the ratable share rule was to provide “for the treatment of boot received by holders of
preferred stock.” Advisory Group Recommendations of Subchapters C, J, and K of the Internal
Revenue Code: Hearing on H.R. 4459Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 86th Cong.,
473, 546 (1959). Whatever merits this policy reason may have, it does not explain why the
ratable share rule is also applied to holders of common stock.
96. 26 U.S.C. § 356(a)(2)(2012).
97. Id. § 316(a)
98. Treas. Reg. § 1.316-2(a).
99. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, Technical Explanation of the
Revenue Provisions Contained in the “American Jobs and Closing Tax Loopholes Act of 2010,” for
Consideration on the Floor of the House of Representatives, JCX-29-10, at 303 (2010)
(hereinafter “JCT Explanation”) (proposing to eliminate section 356(a)(2)’s reference to
“accumulated” earnings, so “that earnings and profits references in section 356(a)(2) not be
interpreted to exclude current year earnings and profits”).
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Prior to 1936, the predecessor to section 316 simply referred to
distributions out of “accrued” earnings. 100 During this time,
distributions were determined by current year earnings as well as
accumulated earnings. 101 In 1936 Congress amended the predecessor
to section 316 to state a separate category of distributions out of the
current year’s earnings so that taxpayers could receive credits against
an undistributed profits surtax, now defunct, when the corporation
had operated at a loss in prior years and would otherwise be unable
to pay a dividend. 102
Present-day section 356(a)(2) was drafted prior to the 1936
amendment to present-day section 316. 103 Because both current year
and accumulated earnings were used before the amendment to
section 316, the better interpretation of section 356(a)(2) is that the
current year earnings and the prior year losses will be used to
determine the amount of the distribution taxed as a dividend. 104
Either way, there is no logical reason why distributions under section
356(a)(2) should be limited in this way when they are not limited in
the rest of the code.
E. Earnings of Which Corporation?
Section 356(a)(2) directs that, in determining how much of the
deemed dividend is taxed as a dividend, the ratable share of the
accumulated earnings of “the corporation” must be taken into
account. The statute leaves open the question of which corporation’s
earnings must be taken into account—target or acquiring.
For corporations whose ownership is not identical, the IRS and
courts have stated that only the earnings of the target corporation are

100. See Harry J. Rudick, “Dividends” and “Earnings or Profits” Under the Income Tax
Law: Corporate Non-Liquidating Distributions, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 865, 867 (1941).
101. See id. at 867–69; see also Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U.S. 339, 344 (1918) (“Dividends
are . . . expended as such by the stockholder without regard to whether they are declared from
the most recent earnings, or from a surplus accumulated from the earnings of the past, or are
based on the increased value of the property of the corporation.”).
102. See Rudick, supra note 100 at 868–69. Rudick argues that the distinction in section
316 should be done away with and that shareholders should be able to offset current year
earnings against prior deficits. Id. at 904–05. Perhaps Rudick would support the current
language of section 356(a)(2).
103. See Internal Revenue Act of 1924 § 203(d)(2), 43 Stat. 253 (1924).
104. Cf. Vesper Co. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 131 F.2d 200, 205 (8th Cir. 1942)
(holding that both current and accumulated earnings are taken into account in interpreting a
statutory provision regarding redemptions with language similar to section 356(a)(2)).

490

CROWLEY.FINV2 (DO NOT DELETE)

471

11/23/20153:53 PM

Finishing the Job on Section 356(a)(2)

taken into account. 105 Although the language in the statute is
ambiguous, this conclusion makes sense because section 356(a)(2) was
drafted to address the bailout of the target corporation’s earnings. 106
The harder question is which corporation’s earnings should be
considered when the corporations’ ownership is identical. Courts are
split on this question. The IRS and the Fifth Circuit believe that the
earnings of both corporations should be taken into account because
when “there is complete identity . . . the stockholders control both
corporations and it is virtually impossible to tell which corporation is
in reality ‘the corporation’ distributing the cash.” 107 But the Third
Circuit and the Tax Court take the view that only the target
corporation’s earnings should be taken into account. 108 Although the
Tax Court and Third Circuit’s position may seem counterintuitive,
the plain language of the statute seems to support this result. 109 This
provision creates uncertainty for taxpayers and “it is up to Congress
to correct this defect.” 110
F. When Does Boot Have the Effect of a Dividend?
Section 356(a)(2) only applies when boot has the effect of a
dividend. But Congress failed to mention when boot has the effect
of a dividend. Instead, Congress left this messy question for the
courts to deal with.
The first judicial decisions to decide the matter held that all boot
received pursuant to a reorganization had the effect of a dividend. 111

105. Rev. Rul. 75-83, 1975 C.B. 112 (“[R]egardless of which corporation makes a
distribution, the amount of the dividend is measured by reference to the earnings and profits
of the transferor.”); see, e.g., Ross v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 793 (Ct. Cl. 1959);
Hawkinson v. Comm’r, 235 F.2d 747 (2d Cir. 1956); Comm’r v. Owens, 69 F.2d 597 (5th
Cir. 1934).
106. See supra Part II.A.
107. Davant v. Comm’r, 366 F.2d 874, 889 (5th Cir. 1966); Rev. Rul. 70-240,
1970-1 C.B. 81.
108. Atlas Tool Co. v. Comm’r, 614 F.2d 860, 867–68 (3d Cir. 1980); Am. Mfg. Co. v.
Comm’r, 55 T.C. 204, 224–31 (1970).
109. See Am. Mfg. Co., 55 T.C. at 231.
110. Id.
111. See e.g., Owens, 69 F.2d at 598; Knapp Monarch Co. v. Comm’r, 1 T.C. 59 (1942); J.
Weingarten Inc. v. Comm’r, 44 B.T.A. 798, 805–10 (1941); McCord v. Comm’r,, 31 B.T.A.
342 (1934); Woodard v. Comm’r,, 30 B.T.A. 1216, 1227–28 (1934). The Supreme Court even
seemed to adopt this automatic dividend rule in Comm’r v. Bedford’s Estate, where it held that
cash received in a recapitalization reorganization, where the corporation has sufficient earnings,
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This so-called “automatic dividend rule” makes sense from a strict
policy perspective. If reorganizations are simply a “mere change in
form” of the corporation, 112 then any cash received must necessarily
be a dividend because the shareholder’s interest in the corporation
does not change, it just continues on in another form. But this
ignores the law that has developed around reorganizations which
allows shareholders to sell a limited amount of their interest and still
qualify for tax-free treatment. 113
The automatic dividend rule was widely criticized and did not
last very long. 114 The IRS abandoned the automatic dividend rule
and took the position that the test to determine section 356(a)(2)
dividend equivalency should be similar to the tests in section
302(b). 115 Courts followed this approach, but differed on how they
applied section 302(b) to reorganizations.
Two competing views emerged. The first, called the Shimberg
test, treated the boot as a hypothetical redemption of the target
corporation’s stock before the reorganization. 116 The second
approach, called the Wright test, treated the boot as a hypothetical
redemption of the acquiring corporation’s stock after the
reorganization. 117 The Supreme Court resolved this split in
Commissioner v. Clark and adopted the Wright test (now called the
Clark test). 118
In Clark, the taxpayer was the sole shareholder of a
corporation. 119 The taxpayer’s corporation merged with a much
larger publicly traded corporation. Initially, the acquiring corporation
offered the taxpayer 425,000 shares of the acquiring corporation for
all of the target corporation’s shares. 120 The taxpayer turned down

is a dividend. 325 U.S. 283, 290–91 (1945). The Court even went a step further in dicta
suggesting that the same result may be reached in acquisitive reorganizations. Id.
112. See supra Part II.A.
113. See supra notes 16–20 and accompanying text.
114. See King, supra note 6 at 734; Stephen Massey, Boot Distributions in Corporate
Reorganizations: Dividend Equivalence and the Continuity of Interest Doctrine, 32 U. FLA. L.
REV. 119, 132 (1980).
115. Rev. Rul. 74-515, 1974-2 C.B. 118; Rev. Rul. 74-516, 1974-2 C.B. 121.
116. Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d 283, 288–89 (5th Cir. 1978).
117. Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600, 606–08 (8th Cir. 1973).
118. Comm’r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 737–40 (1989).
119. Id. at 731.
120. Id.
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that offer and accepted a counter-offer for 300,000 shares of the
acquiring corporation and $3,250,000 cash. 121
Under the Shimberg test the taxpayer had a 100% interest in the
target corporation before the reorganization. The taxpayer would be
deemed to have sold a certain amount of shares to the target
corporation for the cash. The taxpayer’s interest in the target
corporation after this hypothetical redemption—deemed to occur
before the reorganization—would still be 100%. Because this is not a
meaningful reduction in interest, the boot would be deemed a
dividend. The Court recognized that the Shimberg test will result in
dividend treatment any time shareholders receive boot pro rata in a
reorganization. 122 Because it is often the case that boot will be
distributed pro rata, the Court adopted the Wright test instead. 123
Following the Wright test, the taxpayer was treated as receiving
the full 425,000 shares originally offered and then redeeming
125,000 of those shares—to reflect his actual interest in the
acquiring corporation of 300,000—after the reorganization. 124
Viewed this way, the taxpayer’s interest in the acquiring corporation
was 1.30% before the redemption and 0.92% after the deemed
redemption. 125 This reduction in interest qualified for sale treatment
under the section 302(b) 50/80 test 126discussed in section II.A. The
Supreme Court concluded that the boot did not have the effect of a
dividend and that the boot should be taxed as capital gain. 127
An important policy driving this decision was that the Supreme
Court did not want every pro rata distribution of cash to result in a
dividend. 128 The Court also reasoned that dividend treatment is meant
to be the exception to capital gains treatment in section 356. 129 The
Court recognized, however, that both of the competing views were
“somewhat artificial” and chose the test that was “less artificial.” 130

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id
Id. at 739.
Id.
Id. at 740.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 738–39.
Id. at 739.
Id. at 741.
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The test for whether boot has the effect of a dividend has been
resolved by Clark. But the Clark test is not a perfect test. Clark was
simply a choice between the lesser of two evils. Congress should
finish the job they started ninety years ago by clarifying when boot
has the effect of a dividend and supplanting Clark with a test that is
less artificial.
III. FIXING SECTION 356(A)(2)
Due to the shortcomings of section 356(a)(2) discussed above,
section 356(a)(2) has been attacked by Congress on-and-off for the
last sixty years. 131 Section 356(a)(2)’s boot-within-gain limitation, in
particular, has been subject to widespread criticism. 132 The Obama
administration began targeting section 356(a)(2)’s boot-within-gain
limitation in 2009. In February 2015, the Obama administration
proposed repealing the boot-within-gain limitation and aligning
section 356(a)(2)’s treatment of earnings with section 316. 133 On
May 28, 2010, the House approved a bill that would have
substantially revised section 356(a)(2); 134however, the revision did
not make it into final law. 135
Section 356(a)(2) can be improved by building on the Obama
proposals and the 2010 House bill. In addition, Congress should
amend section 356(a)(2) to explicitly direct when boot will have the
effect of a dividend. This amendment should supplant the Clark rule
with a test that compares the shareholder’s economic interest in the
target corporation before the reorganization with the shareholder’s
interest in the acquiring corporation after the reorganization.

131. For a comprehensive treatment of these attacks, see King, supra note 6, at 728–31.
132. See, e.g., Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Form vs. Substance in the Treatment of Taxable
Corporate Distributions, 85 TAXES 119, 129 (2007) (stating that “there is no known reason”
for the boot-within-gain limitation); Seth Green & Stafford Smiley, The Curious Case of the
Partial Loophole Closer, CORP. TAX’N, Jan./Feb. 2010, at 38; Bruce D. Shoulson, Boot
Taxation: The Blunt Toe of the Automatic Rule, 20 TAX L. REV. 573, 578–79 (1964) (stating
that the boot-within-gain limitation was a drafting error).
133. 2016 Revenue Proposals, supra note 7, at 121.
134. American Jobs and Closing Tax Loopholes Act of 2010, H.R. 4213, 111th Cong. §
422 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 House Bill].
135. See Unemployment Compensation Extension Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-205,
124 Stat. 2236 (2010).
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A. Fixing Section 356(a)(2) with the House Bill and the
Obama Proposal

The 2016 Revenue Proposals and the 2010 House bill would
both amend section 356(a)(2) to be more consistent with the rest of
the Internal Revenue Code. Section 356(a)(2) should be revised
using the Obama proposal and the 2010 House bill as a template
with further improvements discussed below.
The Obama proposal specifically proposes repealing the bootwithin-gain limitation. 136 The 2010 House bill also would repeal the
limitation by striking the following language: “then there shall be
treated as a dividend to each distributee such an amount of the gain
recognized under paragraph (1).” 137 Repealing the boot-within-gain
limitation is an important way section 356(a)(2) can be amended to
stop abusive bailouts—as discussed in Section II.B— and bring
section 356(a)(2)’s treatment of dividends in conformity with the
rest of the Internal Revenue Code.
Prior to the 2016 Revenue Proposals, the Obama administration
only targeted the ratable share provision of section 356(a)(2). 138 In
the 2016 Revenue Proposals, the Obama administration “proposes
to align the available pool of earnings and profits to test for dividend
treatment with the rules of section 316 governing ordinary
distributions.” 139 This would presumably eliminate both the ratable
share provision and section 356(a)(2)’s reference to accumulated
earnings. This would be a positive change that would eliminate the
potential for abuse in closely held corporations and create
consistency with the rest of the code. 140
The 2010 House bill accomplished the task of eliminating both
the ratable share provision and the accumulated earnings provision
by striking them and stating “then the amount of other property or
money shall be treated as a dividend to the extent of the earnings
and profits of the corporation.” 141 The Joint Committee on Taxation
136. See 2016 Revenue Proposals, supra note 7, at 121.
137. See 2010 House Bill, supra note 134, § 422.
138. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S
FISCAL
YEAR
2015
REVENUE
PROPOSALS
96
(2014),
available
at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-ExplanationsFY2015.pdf.
139. 2016 Revenue Proposals, supra note 7, at 121.
140. See infra Part III.C.
141. See 2010 House Bill, supra note134 § 422.
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explained that the language in the 2010 House bill treats boot as a
dividend to the extent of all earnings of the corporation and prevents
any interpretation that excludes current year earnings. 142 This
language should be adopted and then improved by clarifying that
“dividend” in section 356(a)(2) should have the same meaning as
section 316: “then the amount of other property or money shall be
treated as a dividend as defined in section 316.” 143
The 2010 House bill went further than the Obama proposals by
adding a new subsection to section 356(a)(2). This subsection
directed that the earnings of both the acquiring and the target
corporation should be taken into account in Type D acquisitive
reorganizations and “any other reorganization specified by the
Secretary.” 144 This would effectively adopt and broaden the IRS and
Fifth Circuit’s view that earnings of both corporations should be
taken into account when the ownership is identical. The House bill
also directed that the amount which is a dividend will be determined
under rules similar to section 304(b)(2) and (5), 145 meaning that in
most situations the earnings of the acquiring corporation will be
looked at first (and reduced) followed by the earnings of the target
corporation. This provision would solve a question left unanswered
by section 356(a)(2) and should be adopted.
The new subsection would apply to Type D acquisitive
reorganizations as well as “other reorganization[s] specified by the
Secretary.”146 The Joint Committee on Taxation explained that
these other reorganizations may be triangular reorganizations that
involve common control, but that the Secretary is not limited to
triangular reorganizations. 147 This broad grant of authority to the
Treasury may create some uncertainty. The new subsection could be

142. See JCT Explanation, supra note 99, at 302–03.
143. It would be more consistent to borrow language from section 302(d) and state:
“then the amount of other property or money shall be treated as a distribution of property to
which section 301 applies.” However, this language would change the practice in section
356(a)(2) of treating boot that has the effect of a dividend as a dividend to the extent of
earnings and any excess as capital gain as opposed to a return of capital. See 26 U.S.C. § 301(c)
(2012). In drafting the 2010 House bill, Congress intended that the practice of dividend
treatment first then capital gain treatment remain intact. See JCT Explanation, supra note 99,
at 302.
144. See 2010 House Bill, supra note 134, § 422.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See JCT Explanation, supra note 99, at 303.
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improved by narrowing this grant of authority to reorganizations
between parties under common control. Adding this provision
would also validate the current practice of only looking to the target
corporation’s earnings when ownership is not identical; however,
legislative acquiescence is not typically viewed as a strong indicator of
legislative intent. 148 The provision could therefore be improved by
stating that earnings of the target corporation will be the only
earnings looked to except as otherwise specified.
If the boot-within-gain limitation were repealed and the other
recommended changes to section 356(a)(2) were adopted, there
would be greater consistency in the tax code and tax loopholes
would be closed. But another consequence would be an increase on
the amount of boot that would be taxed if the boot has the effect of
a dividend. Because the boot-within-gain limitation will survive
under section 356(a)(1) when boot does not have the effect of a
dividend, taxpayers will prefer to fall under section 356(a)(1).
Therefore, Congress should provide a clear statutory test for when
boot has the effect of a dividend and replace the Clark test with
something less “artificial.”
B. Fixing the Test for When Boot has the Effect of a Dividend
The Obama proposals and the 2010 House bill do not change
the test for dividend equivalency. Because changes to section
356(a)(2) would raise the stakes for taxpayers, the Clark test should
be supplanted with a test that more accurately reflects the economic
realities of a reorganization. This proposed test, hereafter referred to
as “Old Shimberg” (which is the same test the district court used in
Shimberg 149—hence the name Old Shimberg), compares the
shareholder’s interest in the target corporation before the
reorganization with the shareholder’s interest in the acquiring
corporation after the reorganization.
The Supreme Court rejected the Shimberg test because it would
cause every pro rata distribution of boot to have the effect of a
dividend. 150 This was the correct result, 151 but, as the Supreme Court

148. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 67 (1988).
149. Shimberg v. United States, 415 F. Supp. 832 (M.D. Fla. 1976), rev’d, 577 F.2d 283
(5th Cir. 1978).
150. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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recognized, 152 Clark has its own shortcomings. First, Clark only
looks at one side of the transaction and ignores the shareholder’s
interests in relation to other target shareholders’ interests. Second,
Clark does not account for preexisting interests a shareholder may
have in the acquiring corporation. This can lead to abuse where a
shareholder of the acquiring corporation is also a shareholder of the
target corporation.
For example, assume that S owns 25 out of 100 shares in the
target corporation and 50 out of 100 shares in the acquiring
corporation. The acquiring corporation acquires the target
corporation in a qualifying reorganization for 100 newly issued
shares of the acquiring corporation. As controlling shareholder of the
acquiring corporation, S modifies the deal so that he receives cash for
his target stock instead of acquiring corporation stock. Under the
Clark test, S is deemed to have received 25 shares of the acquiring
corporation’s stock to add to the 50 shares he already owns, 200
shares of the acquiring corporation stock are deemed outstanding,
and S has a 38% interest in the acquiring corporation after the
reorganization. Then, S’s 25 shares are redeemed, the acquiring
corporation only has 175 shares outstanding, and S has a 29%
interest in the acquiring corporation. 153 Under section 302(b),
S’spost-redemption ownership is less than 80% (76% in this case) of
his pre-redemption ownership in the acquiring corporation. 154
Therefore, the boot does not have the effect of a dividend and the
boot is taxed as capital gain. But this result should not be correct
because S has effectively increased his ownership interest in the
target corporation from 25% to 29%.
Comparing S’s ownership in the target corporation before the
reorganization to S’s ownership interest in the acquiring corporation
after the reorganization would solve this problem. 155 In the situation
above, S would own 25% before the reorganization and 29% after the
reorganization. This is a 116% increase in interest. 156 Therefore, the

151. See Michael L. Schler, Rebooting Section 356: Part 1—The Statute, TAX NOTES, July
19, 2010, at 299.
152. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
153. 50 shares owned divided by 175 shares outstanding.
154. 29% actual interest divided by the 38% deemed interest.
155. See Schler, supra note 152, at 299–300 (arguing that the dividend equivalency test
should be applied using the Old Shimberg methodology).
156. 29% post-acquisition interest divided by the 25% pre-acquisition interest.
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boot would have the effect of a dividend. This reflects the economic
reality of what happened: S used his position in the acquiring
corporation to give himself cash in the transaction. Under Clark, S is
able to bailout corporate earnings while avoiding dividend
treatment. Old Shimberg closes this loophole.
Old Shimberg would provide the same result as Clark in other
circumstances where Clark reaches the right result. In the case of
Clark itself, Old Shimberg would compare the taxpayer’s 100%
interest in his corporation to his 0.92% interest in the acquiring
corporation and the boot would be treated as capital gain. 157 But Old
Shimberg fixes Clark’s shortcomings by looking at both sides of the
transaction and considering shareholders’ preexisting interests in the
acquiring corporation.
The Fifth Circuit overturned Old Shimberg because the boot
distribution was pro rata. 158 Because the boot distribution was pro
rata, the target corporation shareholders could not have had a
meaningful reduction in their interests in the target corporation. 159
But as the Supreme Court in Clark pointed out, this effectively
brought back the automatic dividend rule. 160 Unfortunately, the Old
Shimberg test was not considered in Clark.
Arguably, Old Shimberg has one shortcoming. As the Fifth
Circuit pointed out in rejecting Old Shimberg, any time the acquiring
corporation is considerably larger than the target corporation the
boot will be treated as capital gain. 161 However, this shortcoming is
not a shortcoming of Old Shimberg; it is a shortcoming of the
current state of the continuity of interest doctrine. 162 Any time a
closely-held corporation is acquired by a large, publicly-held
corporation the shareholders who controlled the closely-held

157. Old Shimberg will reach the same result as Clark when a shareholder receives a
disproportionate amount of boot in a reorganization. For example, say S owns 20 out of 100
shares of the target corporation and no shares of the acquiring corporation. In a qualifying
reorganization, all of the shareholders receive one share of the acquiring corporation for each
of their shares in the target corporation. But S receives only 10 shares and some cash. Under
Clark, S would go from 10% to 5% resulting in capital gains treatment. Under Old Shimberg, S
would go from 20% to 5% resulting in capital gains treatment.
158. Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d 283, 289 (5th Cir. 1978).
159. Id.
160. Comm’r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739 (1989).
161. Shimberg, 577 F.2d at 288.
162. The current state of the continuity of interest doctrine and its effect on the overall
reorganization regime is briefly discussed in Part IV.C.
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corporation become mere profit shareholders—that is, shareholders
without a controlling interest in the target corporation as an ongoing
concern. The continuity of interest doctrine allows this result by only
focusing on the nature of the consideration in a reorganization and
not requiring shareholders to retain control.
Because the continuity of interest doctrine allows controlling
shareholders to sell their corporation and become insignificant
shareholders in the acquiring corporation, Old Shimberg accurately
reflects economic realities by giving capital gains treatment to such
reorganizations. The Old Shimberg court illustrated this reality:
No longer was [the former majority stockholder of the target
corporation] the major ‘owner’ of a successful local company . . . .
He was then the holder of a miniscule percentage of the
outstanding stock of a huge, publicly-held corporation. It is clear
that the merger resulted in a radical change and meaningful
reduction in the nature of the [taxpayer’s] interest in the
continuing business. The net effect of the transaction was a sale by
the [taxpayer] . . . of [his] LSC stock to MGIC for cash and
marketable securities in a publicly owned corporation. 163

In sum, because the recommended revisions to section 356(a)(2)
would increase the amount of boot subject to tax, Congress should
specify when boot has the effect of a dividend. Congress should
statutorily adopt Old Shimberg as the test for when boot has the
effect of a dividend. 164 This test closes loopholes and more accurately
reflects the economic realities of reorganizations by comparing
ownership interests before and after the reorganization.
C. Afterword: Fixing the Continuity of Interest Doctrine
As an afterword, it is worth discussing the conflict the current
approach to dividend equivalency has with the continuity of interest
doctrine. The current approach uses principles from section 302 to
determine if boot has the effect of a dividend. 165 The section 302 test
determines whether a redemption of stock by a shareholder results in
enough of a “meaningful reduction in interest” to tax the property
received as capital gain. In other words, the redemption test seeks to
determine discontinuity of interest. Tax-free reorganizations, on the
163. Shimberg v. United States, 415 F. Supp. 832, 836–37 (M.D. Fla. 1976).
164. See Schler, supra note 152, at 300 (arguing the same).
165. See supra Part II.F.
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other hand, are premised on the idea that shareholders are
continuing their interest in the corporation and, therefore, no
taxable sale has taken place. 166 This practice of applying section 302
to section 356 may seem suspect. But as one commentator points
out, the problems in the current regime do not stem from this
inherent conflict, but instead stem from the current state of the
continuity of interest doctrine. 167
The general rule for continuity of interest is that at least 40% of
the consideration received must be the acquiring corporation’s
stock. 168 But if continuity of interest required the shareholders to
collectively obtain a substantial continuing ownership interest in the
acquiring corporation, then the concern of shareholders selling their
interest but receiving tax-free treatment disappears. And the
uncomfortableness of applying section 302 to section 356
disappears. This is because, although the individual shareholder may
have cashed-out some of his interest, the shareholders as a whole will
have a substantial continuing interest in the acquiring corporation. 169
Compare this to the current regime where the shareholders of a
corporation may reduce their collective ownership of 100% in the
target corporation to 3% in the acquiring corporation. As long as
40% 170 of the consideration is paid in stock, the shareholders’
interests are deemed to continue for purposes of the continuity of
interest requirement.
This issue has been covered elsewhere 171 and is outside of the
scope of this Comment, which focuses on section 356(a)(2)
specifically. But this issue is mentioned because a total fix to section
356(a)(2) may require a fix to the principal rule underlying taxfree reorganizations.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Obama administration and the House of Representatives
have recently made efforts to reform section 356(a)(2). Section
166. See supra Part I.A.
167. See Massey, supra note 114, at 139–40.
168. See supra Part II.B..
169. See Massey, supra note 114, at 140.
170. Note that 40% is a minimum threshold. Different types of reorganizations may set
out stricter requirements.
171. See, e.g., Massey, supra note 114; See also Skillman, supra note 12, for a more
generalized discussion on the underlying policies and doctrines of tax-free reorganizations.
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356(a)(2) treats dividends inconsistently with the rest of the code
without justification. Section 356(a)(2) also leaves taxpayers with
uncertainty as to how several of its provisions apply. It also provides
opportunities for tax avoidance. The boot-within-gain limitation has
received particular attention by the Obama administration, as well as
commentators, because of the opportunity it creates for repatriation
of offshore earnings and general tax avoidance.
Section 356(a)(2) should be amended to fix these problems by
adopting the Obama proposals and the 2010 House bill
amendments along with the recommendations discussed above.
These revisions would eliminate the boot-within-gain limitation and
the ratable share rule. The revisions would direct that earnings of the
current year be counted first, followed by accumulated earnings. And
the revisions would clarify whose earnings must be considered. These
changes would make section 356(a)(2) consistent with the rest of
the code and eliminate opportunities to bailout corporate earnings.
Congress should also amend section 356(a)(2) to state when
boot has the effect of a dividend. The amendment should supplant
the current Clark rule with the Old Shimberg rule. The Old Shimberg
rule compares the shareholder’s interest in the target corporation
before the reorganization with the shareholder’s interest in the
acquiring corporation after the reorganization and determines
whether there has been a meaningful reduction in interest under
section 302(b). This test more accurately reflects the economic
realities of a reorganization. Specifically, it improves on the Clark
test by taking into account the shareholder’s interest on both sides of
the transaction and by accounting for preexisting interests in the
acquiring corporation.
Trevor Crowley*
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